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BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
By

JOSEPH Epps CLAXTON *

This survey article deals with recent Georgia cases and statutes in the
areas of partnerships, corporations, securities regulation, and fair business
practices.
I.

PARTNERSHIPS

The only significant case involving partnerships decided during the current survey period was Mills v. Kochis, ' which involved the validity of a
repurchase commitment by the general partners to the limited partners in
the event of foreclosure proceedings. The commitment, which was contained in the articles of partnership, amounted to an indemnification
agreement.
When the partnership failed, the limited partners brought an action
against the general partners that was based on the repurchase commitment. Various defenses were raised, the principal one being based on a
Georgia statute which states:
A limited partner shall not receive from a general partner or out of the
partnership property any part of his contribution until (a) All liabilities
of the partnership except liabilities to general partners and to limited
partners on account of their contributions, have been paid or there remains property of the partnership sufficient to pay them .2
Taking note of this statute, the court of appeals concluded that the trial
court had been in error when it granted the motion of the limited partners
for summary judgment. In the words of the court:
This qualifying language is not in the articles of partnership under consideration, but it is in the law, and is therefore controlling. . . . An agreement to indemnify limited partners made by general partners is enforceable. But it is a condition precedent thereto that creditors other than the
partners shall first be paid ....
[Clreditors take precedence over limited
partners . . . regardless of whether or not such a restriction also appears
within the articles of partnership themselves.3
Mills was a case of first impression in Georgia,4 and its potential impact
*

Associate Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Emory

University (A.B., 1968); Duke University (J.D., 1972). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
1. 132 Ga. App. 492, 208 S.E.2d 352 (1974).
2. GA. CODE ANN. §75-417(1) (Rev. 1973).
3. 132 Ga. App. at 494, 208 S.E.2d at 353. The only permissible deviation from this
pattern arises when a "limited partner may be considered as an ordinary business creditor
in other than partnership contribution situations." Id.
4. It should be noted that a New York statute identical to the Georgia provision was
previously considered in Herrick v. Guild, 257 App. Div. 341, 13 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1939), with
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is considerable. Its result can in no way be considered surprising, however,
for the statute upon which it is based is quite clear.
HI.

A.

CORPORATIONS

CorporationBy Estoppel

The doctrine of corporation by estoppel is based on the concept that
a person who has contracted or otherwise dealt with a body purporting to
be a corporation, is, by reason of having dealt with it as such, estopped
from denying its corporate existence.'
The validity of the doctrine was reaffirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court
during the preceding survey period in the case of Cahoon v. Ward.,
The doctrine of corporation by estoppel was examined once again in
Walker v. Joanna M. Knox & Associates, Inc.7 In that case the court of
appeals concluded that "[tihe existence of a corporation cannot be attacked by persons who have dealt with it as a corporation." 8 Ironically,
though, the outcome of the case did not really hinge on the doctrine of
corporation by estoppel. The trial court had awarded $10,000 to the plaintiff corporation on a theory of quantum meruit, and this result was affirmed by the court of appeals. The trial court had also held, however, that
a contract under consideration in Walker was invalid because the corporation in question was nonexistent at the time of the execution of the contract. This deprived the corporation of certain sums it had sought in reliance on the contract. The corporation, apparently satisfied with its $10,000
quantum meruit award, did not challenge the trial court on this point.
Nevertheless, it is certainly regrettable that the position of the trial court
regarding the contract was allowed to pass without adverse comment on
the part of the court of appeals, for that position is totally contrary to the
overall thrust of the doctrine of corporation by estoppel. The treatment of
the Walker case by the court of appeals is both confusing and inconsistent.
B.

Cumulative Voting

In Givens v. Spencer," the Georgia Supreme Court dealt with the distinction between straight and cumulative voting of shares in the election of
directors. That distinction is not a complex one.
In voting for directors, each voting share has as many votes as there are
results similar to that in the Mills case. Mills specifically relied upon Herrick.
5. Cason v. State, 16 Ga. App. 820, 829, 86 S.E. 644, 649 (1914).
6. 231 Ga. 872, 204 S.E.2d 622 (1974). For a discussion of this case, see Claxton, Annual
Survey of Georgia Law: Agency and Business Associations, 26 MERCER L. REV. 21, 31 (1974).
7. 132 Ga. App. 12, 207 S.E.2d 570 (1974).
8. Id. at 13, 207 S.E.2d at 572.
9. 232 Ga. 806, 209 S.E.2d 157 (1974).
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directors to be elected, i.e., if five directors are to be elected, each share
has five votes. Unless the cumulative voting right has been given shareholders by constitution, statute, charter or by-law, the five votes in our
illustration can be voted one each for five nominees but cannot be cumulated so as to give more than one vote per nominee. If the shareholders
have the cumulative voting right each shareholder may multiply the number of shares (votes) he is entitled to cast by the number of directors to
be elected and may then give the total votes to one or more nominees in
any proportion he desires. 0
Georgia does not provide for cumulative voting "unless such voting is
expressly authorized in the articles of incorporation." ' I In Givens, the court
noted that
[tihe trial judge ruled that the appellee, who owned 650 shares of the
voting stock of the corporation as opposed to appellant's ownership of only
350 shares, could cast his 650 votes for each of the corporate directors to
be, elected, thereby electing all of the directors of the corporation. The
appellant [contended] . . . that this method of voting amounted to cumulative voting, that cumulative voting was not provided for in the articles of incorporation, and that the trial judge's ruling was erroneous. 2
The supreme court quite correctly concluded that the voting procedure in
question "was not cumulative voting, and appellant's contention that it
was such is without merit."'" The only surprising aspect of the Givens case
is that: the appellant's attorneys could have so thoroughly misunderstood
the meaning of cumulative voting.
C.

Preemptive Rights

Preemptive rights give shareholders "the privilege to purchase in proportion to their holdings new issues of stock by the corporation before the
stock is offered to the public. . . ."" Unfortunately, preemptive rights
providelittle comfort to a shareholder who for some reason - commonly
a lack of money - does not wish to exercise those rights. Although there
are supplementary methods for protecting the equity interests of shareholders,"5 they are frequently overlooked when documents of incorporation
are prepared. In such a situation, a shareholder must exercise one of two
unattractive options. He may simply accept the dilution of his ownership
interest. This is what will occur most of the time. In the alternative, the
shareholder may bring a judicial challenge to the issuance of the new stock.
10.

N. LArIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 354 (2d ed. 1971).
11. GA. CODE ANN. §22-608(d) (Rev. 1970).
12. 232 Ga. at 806, 209 S.E.2d at 157.
13. Id. at 807, 209 S.E.2d at 158.
14. F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE §3.39, at 42 (1971).
15. O'Neal suggests "a charter clause prohibiting without the unanimous consent of the
shareholders any increase in the amount of capital stock or any allotment or reissuance of
stock." Id. at 45.
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Such a challenge must be based on the theory that the issuance was not
undertaken for a proper corporate purpose.
Just such a matter was argued in the case of Tallant v. Executive Equities, Inc.'6 That case involved a new issue of voting stock that led to a shift
of control from the former controlling shareholder to another individual
who was serving as the president and as a director of the corporation. The
old controlling shareholder, who for unstated reasons voluntarily chose not
to exercise his preemptive rights, insisted that the issuance of the stock
"was not for a corporate purpose. but solely for the benefit of the board of
directors who desired to perpetuate themselves in office.""
Various affidavits and depositions made it clear that one purpose of the
new issue was to oust the original controlling shareholder from his position.
In addition, however, the directors apparently felt that a broadening of the
shareholder base (a goal which the new issue really did not bring about)
was important for the overall welfare of the corporation. Moreover, the
financing to be obtained through a new issue of voting stock was deemed
by the directors to be absolutely necessary in order to meet the substantial
interest burden carried by the corporation. There was fear of an imminent
threat of foreclosure.
The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the mere fact that a shift
of control would result from the new issue was "not material to our decision
without some firm evidence that the transaction was fraudulent."' 8 The
needs to raise capital and to create a broader shareholder base were held
to be a sufficient corporate purpose.
D. Rights Of Dissenting Shareholders
A shareholder who dissents from a corporate action approved by the
necessary majority of his fellow shareholders has a traditional right to
demand that the corporation purchase his shares for their fair value. Such
a provision may be found in both the present 9 and the former' Georgia
Corporations Codes. Under the existing code, the dissenting shareholder
must file his demand for payment within twenty days after receiving notification from the corporation of the approval of the action in question.',
Under the old code the shareholder was required to make his demand
within twenty days after the vote approving the corporate action. 2 In
addition, the old code provided that once a demand for payment was
made, the individual involved "shall cease to be a stockholder in the corporation in which he held a stock and shall have no rights with respect to
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

232 Ga. 807, 209 S.E.2d 159 (1974).
Id. at 809, 209 S.E.2d at 160.
Id. at 810, 209 S.E.2d at 161,
GA. CODE ANN. §22-1202 (Rev. 1970).
Ga. Laws, 1937-38, p. 214, repealed by Ga. Laws, 1968, p. 565.
GA. CODE ANN. §22-1202(c) (Rev. 1970).
Ga. Laws, 1937-38, p. 233.
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such stock except the right to receive payment therefore.
"2 The pres24
ent law contains comparable language.
Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Corr dealt with the old code's version of the statutes discussed above. In Aaron Rents, the dissenting shareholder was three
days late in making his demand for payment. Nevertheless, the corporation made no protest and in fact offered to pay three dollars per share (a
substantial profit) for the shareholder's stock. The shareholder delayed in
accepting the money, however, and ultimately sought to have the benefit
of the rights he would have enjoyed as an owner of stock. These rights
included the issuance to him of certain new stock to which he would have
been entitled as an ordinary shareholder.
The corporation declined to recognize any rights of the shareholder except to receive payment for his stock, and sought a declaratory judgment
that its position was correct. Ironically, the shareholder thus found himself
in the position of arguing that the corporation's waiver of the twenty-day
time limit for the payment demand was ineffective. The court of appeals
held that the waiver was effective and that by demanding the right to have
his stock purchased, the shareholder had given up all other rights.
E.

Inspection Rights Of Shareholders

For the second time in three years, the case of Master Mortgage Corp.
v. Craven2 appeared before the Georgia Court of Appeals during the current survey period. In its original opinion, the court had held that a shareholder's attempt to inspect assorted corporate records was too broad in its
scope. The shareholder was deemed to have failed to satisfy the requirement that the specific items he demanded to see must have some relevance
to his "interests as a shareholder." 7 The shareholder had simply gone too
far in his demands, including, among other things, a reference to "all...
[the] corporate books, records and files pertaining in any way to the
business or financial status of the corporation at any time since its incep2
tion."
On remand, the trail court restricted the request for inspection in various
particulars, and then proceeded to grant it. The corporation appealed. On
its review of the case, the court of appeals was confronted with several
issues. The most important of these, however, was whether a shareholder
must begin anew by making another demand for inspection when the
appellate court finds (as occurred in the first Master Mortgage opinion)
23. Id. at 235.
24. GA. CODE ANN. §22-1202(d) (Rev. 1970).
25. 133 Ga. App. 296, 211 S.E.2d 156 (1974).
26. 132 Ga. App. 404, 208 S.E.2d 158 (1974). The case was initially reviewed in Master
Mortgage Corp. v. Craven, 127 Ga. App. 367, 193 S.E.2d 567 (1972). The original opinion was
discussed in Claxton, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Agency and Business Associations, 25
MERCER L. REV. 21, 37-38 (1974).
27. 127 Ga. App. at 371, 193 S.E.2d at 570.
28. Id. at 369, 193 S.E.2d at 569.
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that the trial court did not sufficiently restrict or limit the right to inspection. The court held that since it had specifically ruled, in the first Master
Mortgage opinion, as to the manner in which the inspection should be
restricted and limited, there was no error in granting the shareholder's
right of inspection without requiring him to make another demand upon
the corporation.
The position of the court of appeals was logical and reasonable. The
erection of technical barriers to the very basic right of shareholders to
inspect corporate books and records should not be encouraged.
F.

Stock Options

For many corporate executives, stock options represent very attractive
supplementary means of compensation." However, the right to exercise a
stock option is usually contingent upon certain conditions established by
the corporation, and these conditions sometimes present serious obstacles
to the holder of the option. One of the most common limitations placed
on stock options when they are used to attract new executive talent is that
the holder of the option must remain in the continuous employ of the
corporation for a certain period in order to exercise his option rights.
The effect of such a condition was examined in Lowe v. Royal Crown
Cola Co.'" In Lowe, the continuous employment provision in the stock
option agreement was coupled with the statement that the employee in
question (a new senior vice president) would serve "at the pleasure of the
Company and without restriction on the right of the Company to terminate
Optionee's employment at any time."3' The employee was forced to resign
within less than twelve months after he was employed, but nevertheless
sought to exercise his stock option. The employee argued that the continuous employment provision put
too much control in the hands of his employer, who could at any time
unilaterally defeat plaintiff's [the employee's] expectations under the
stock option agreement by discharging him within twelve months after the
agreement was signed. 2
In effect, the Georgia Court of Appeals responded to this argument by
concluding that the employee could read, and must live with the terms he
had accepted.
Interestingly, Lowe was a case of first impression in Georgia. As the court
noted,n3 however, there are numerous cases in other jurisdictions which
29. It should be noted that stock options have declined somewhat in popularity during
the last decade due to certain changes in the tax laws. However, they are still widely used.
For an excellent article on various aspects of stock options, see Vernava, Stock Options:
Corporate,Regulatory and Related Tax Aspects, 30 U. Prrr. L. REV. 197 (1968).
30. 132 Ga. App. 37, 207 S.E.2d 620 (1974).
31. Id. at 38, 207 S.E.2d at 622.
32. Id. at 41, 207 S.E.2d at 624.
33. Id. at 42, 207 S.E.2d at 624.
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have reached the same result on similar fact situations.

G. Procedure
In Mousetrap of Atlanta, Inc. v. Dekle,34 the defendant corporation made
a special appearance to argue that service of process was not properly made
on its registered agent. While the special appearance was still pending,
judgment was entered against the corporation on the basis that it had filed
no answer to the compaint. The corporation filed a motion to vacate the
judgment. This motion was overruled, and on the same day an affidavit
was filed which showed that service had been correctly made. The corporation also withdrew its special appearance in which it alleged lack of service.
Nevertheless, it appealed the judgment against it.
The court of appeals upheld the action of the lower court. In the words
of the Mousetrap opinion:
Any error committed by the trail court in entering judgment . . .
against the corporate defendant while such corporate defendant's special
appearance for the purpose of contesting service was still pending must
be considered harmless in view of the fact that it was established that
service was made upon the proper agent of such corporate defendant and
the corporate defendant
acted to withdraw its special appearance made
35
in such connection.
This result was in compliance with the Georgia Code, which states that
"[t]he court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
36
parties."

H. New Legislation
Several very specific but relatively minor changes were made in the
Georgia Corporations Code37 by the 1975 session of the General Assembly.
Provision was made for documents that have been presented to a superior
court judge to be corrected by articles of correction when such documents
contain errors .3 For the purpose of determining venue in a tort or contract
action involving a corporation, the corporation shall be deemed to reside
in the county in which the contract was made or is to be performed, and
in the county in which the tort cause of action originated, if the corporation
transacts business in that county. 9 Shares of stock which are subordinate
to authorized shares of any other class or series with respect to dividends
or amounts payable on liquidation must now contain on their face or back
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.

131 Ga. App. 758, 206 S.E.2d 562 (1974).
Id. at 758-59, 206 S.E.2d at 562-63.
GA. CODE ANN. §81A-161 (Rev. 1972).
GA. CODE ANN., tit. 22 (Rev. 1970).
Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 583 at 586.
Id.at 588.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

a clear and concise statement of the fact of subordination." Elaborate new
procedures have been established for situations in which the shareholders
seek to act by written consent rather than through a formal meeting.,, An
executive committee of as few as two directors, rather than the three that
were previously required, is now permitted." Among other topics regarding
which some revisions were made are the deposit with the Department of
Administrative Services of amounts due to unknown creditors,43 the filing
45
of annual corporate reports," and the filing of certain documents.
In general, the changes in the Georgia Corporations Code are purely
technical in nature. They do not alter the basic nature of the Corporations
Code.
III.

A.

SECURrriES REGULATION

The Meaning Of "Security"

The issue of whether or not something is a security is fundamental to a
determination of the applicability of both federal and state securities laws.
In the words of one authority:
One of the first questions which should occur to the attorney whose
client proposes to raise funds by the sale of pieces of paper or other property interests is whether those pieces of paper or interests are statutory
securities within the definition of the Securities Act of 1933 or governing
state blue sky laws. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative,
the registration (and other) requirements of the federal and state securities laws may or may not come into play, depending upon whether there
is a "sale" or "offer to sell" that security, whether the security is an
exempt security or, although not exempt, whether it is to be sold in an
exempt transaction.But the significant point is that the careful attorney
should address himself first and foremost to the problem of whether the
pieces of paper or interests in question are "securities."1
In Jaciewicki v. GordarlAssociates, Inc. ,,4the Georgia Court of Appeals
considered the meaning of the term "security" as it was defined in the
Securities Act of 1957, '4 which was recently replaced by the Securities Act
of 1973.11 The judicial tests discussed in Jaciewicki are almost certainly
40. Id. at 589.
41. Id. at 590.
42. Id. at 592.
43. Id. at 597.
44. Id. at 599.
45. Id. at 600.
46. 11 H. SOWARDS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §2.01 (1974) (emphasis in the original).
47. 132 Ga. App. 888, 209 S.E.2d 693 (1974).
48. Ga. Laws, 1957,pp. 134, 136.
49. GA. CODE ANN., tit. 97 (Supp. 1974). For discussions of the new act, see Claxton, supra
note 26, at 44; Trotter & Poe, A Survey of the Georgia Securities Act of 1973, 10 GA. ST. B.
J. 219 (1973) and A Survey of the Georgia Securities Act of 1973: Addendum, 25 MERCER L.
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still applicable to the meaning of security within the 1973 Act,5" even
though the statutory definition found in that act is more elaborate than
the language of the 1957 Act.
According to the position of the court of appeals in the Jaciewicki case,
Georgia has no single judicial test for determining what is a security.
Instead, there are at least four possible tests, and they
are not exclusive of each other. Thus, a factual situation which falls within
the framework of either of the tests, or any combination thereof, will afford
sufficient basis for a finding that a "security" is involved within the meaning of the statute."
The tests themselves are all familiar to securities lawyers. They include
the Joiner, Howey, Risk Capital, and Managerial Efforts tests. The Joiner
test is derived from the case of SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,5 in
which it was held that the meaning of a security was to be based on "what
character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer,
the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the
prospect.''53 The Howey test was set forth in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,51
which states that
an investment contract [security] for purposes of the [1933 Federal]
Securities Act means a contract . . . whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party. ....15
The so-called Risk Capital test was developed by the California Supreme
6
Court in Silver Hills County Club v. Sobieski,"
which looked to a situation
in which promoters solicited risk capital to establish a business for profit.
Any financial benefits to be obtained arise only because the individual
investor risks his capital along with other purchasers. Finally, the Managerial Efforts test relied upon in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,Inc.5"
mandates the finding of a security whenever "the essential managerial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise" are those of the
seller rather than the investor."
In Jaciewicki, the Georgia Court of Appeals dealt with whether certain
"Distributor Agreements" fell within the definition of security. If so, the
defendant had failed to properly register them. The trial court held that
REv. 601, 625 (1974).
50. See GA. CODE ANN. §97-102(a)(16) (Supp. 1974).
51. 132 Ga. App. at 892-93, 209 S.E.2d at 696.
52. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
53. Id. at 352-53.
54. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
55. Id. at 298-99.
56. 55 Cal.2d 811, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 361 P.2d 906 (1961).
57. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
58. Id. at 483.
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the agreements were not securities, and entered summary judgment for the
defendants. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the record did
not reveal that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact.
B.

Alternative Remedies

In Turpin v. Wilson," the court of appeals dealt with another matter
arising under the old Securities Act of 1957. The court held that a purchaser of securities 0 who might otherwise be barred from recovery by reason of being considered a participant in a transaction that violated the
Georgia securities laws could recover the amount paid a seller who fails to
deliver the securities for reasons beyond the seller's control, if the recovery
was based on a theory of money had and received rather than rescission of
the purchase agreement.
In the prior case of Nash v. Jones,6" the Georgia Supreme Court had
considered the question of
whether a participant serving as an officer and director of a corporation
at the time stock of the corporation is issued can recover the sums paid
by him for a portion of said stock under the purchaser's remedies section
of the Georgia Securities Act [of 1957] because said stock was not properly registered in accordance with the Act."2
Holding in the negative, the supreme court stated:
The clear terms of the purchasers' remedies section provides every
director or officer who participated or aided in any way in making a sale
of securities in violation of the Georgia Securities Act [of 1957] shall be
jointly and severally liable to the purchaser. Thus, the plaintiff, by the
terms of the statute under which he seeks to recover, is equally as guilty
of violating the Georgia Securities Act as is the individual defendant
... .Thus the plaintiff, being in pari delicto with the defendants, cannot
recover the sums he paid for the stock issued in violation of the Georgia
Securities Act.6"
The Nash decision was not applicable in Turpin, however, because the
plaintiff in Turpin did not rely upon the rescission theory set forth in the
statute. Instead, the action in Turpin was based on a theory of money had
and received. The 1957 Act provided that nothing in it was intended to
"limit any statutory or common law right of any person in any court for
any act involved in the sale of securities."6 4 Thus, the plaintiff in Turpin
59. 133 Ga. App. 239, 211 S.E.2d 316 (1974).
60. The actual purchaser in Turpin was the plaintiff's decedent.
61. 224 Ga. 372, 162 S.E.2d 392 (1968).
62. Id. at 374, 162 S.E.2d at 393-94. For the purchaser's remedies under the 1957 Act, see
Ga. Laws, 1957, p. 161.
63. 224 Ga. at 375, 162 S.E.2d at 394 (emphasis added).
64. Ga. Laws, 1957, p. 161.
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was perfectly entitled to follow an alternative, non-statutory path to obtain
a remedy.
It should be noted that the Georgia Securities Act of 1973 contains
provisions that parallel those which were critical to the outcome of both
the Turpin and Nash cases. Therefore, those cases are still quite significant
even though a new act has replaced the one with which they dealt.

IV.

FAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES

The Fair Business Practices Act of 197511 was enacted by the last session
of the Georgia General Assembly. According to the Act, its purpose is "to
protect consumers and legitimate business enterprises from unfair or
deceptive practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce in
[Georgia] ....
""
The new legislation contains a lengthy but expressly non-exclusive list
of unlawful acts and practices. 7 It provides for the appointment of an
Administrator and a fifteen-member Consumer Advisory Board,18 and
gives the Administrator the power to seek equitable relief 9 and general
damages70 (on behalf of injured persons) against any violator of the act.
Private actions for equitable relief and general and exemplary damages are
expressly authorized.7
The Fair Business Practices Act has many good features. Unfortunately,
however, it is probably not tough enough. To be completely effective the
Act should authorize criminal penalties, at least for obviously wilful misconduct. It is true that, at the national level, the Federal Trade Commission Act does not provide for such penalties. However, the Sherman Act
does, and Georgia needs equivalent strength in its laws.
65. Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 376.
66. Id. at 376-77.
67. Id. at 378-79.
68. Id. at 380.
69. Id. at 384.
70. Id. at 385-86. The Administrator is expressly prohibited from seeking punitive damages in his representative capacity.
71. Id. at 386.

